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Governments in emerging markets often behave like a "tormented insurer," trying to use non-state-contingent
debt instruments to avoid cuts in payments to private agents despite large fluctuations in public revenues.
In the data, average public debt-GDP ratios decline as the variability of revenues increases, primary
balances and current expenditures follow cyclical patterns sharply at odds with the countercyclical
patterns of industrial countries, and the cyclical variability of public expenditures exceeds that of private
expenditures by a wide margin. This paper proposes a model of a small open economy with incomplete
markets that can rationalize this behavior. In the model a fiscal authority makes optimal expenditure
and debt plans given shocks to output and revenues, and private agents make optimal consumption
and asset accumulation plans. Quantitative analysis of the model calibrated to Mexico yields a negative
relationship between average public debt and revenue variability similar to the one observed in the
data. The model mimics Mexico's GDP correlations of government purchases and the primary balance.
The ratio of public-to-private expenditures fluctuates widely and the implied welfare costs dwarf conventional














The empirical regularities of ¯scal policy in developing countries di®er from from those observed
in the industrial world in four key respects:
(1) The ratios of public revenue to GDP are signi¯cantly smaller on average and substan-
tially more volatile, as Figures 1 and 2 show.
(2) Average public debt-GDP ratios decline as the variability of public revenue ratios in-
creases (see Figure 3), so the higher variability of revenues in developing countries is associated
with lower average debt ratios.
(3) The cyclical variability of government expenditures exceeds that of private expenditures
by a large margins (see Figure 4).
(4) Fiscal policy is countercyclical in industrial countries but acyclical or slightly procyclical
in developing countries. In particular, GDP and the primary ¯scal balance (government expen-
ditures) are positively (negatively) correlated over the business cycle in industrial countries,
while in developing countries the GDP correlation of the primary balance (government expen-
ditures) is close to zero or slightly negative (postivive). Talvi and V¶ egh (2005) and Gavin and
Perotti (1997) ¯rst documented this fact, and studies by Catao and Sutton (2002), Kaminsky,
Reinhart and V¶ egh (2004), and Alessina and Tabellini (2005) provide detailed cross-country
evidence.
This paper argues that the striking di®erences in the stylized facts of ¯scal policy in de-
veloping economies may result from the combination of frictions in the ¯nancial markets and
imperfections in their own structure of government revenues and outlays. In particular, this
paper models ¯scal authorities as playing the role of a \tormented insurer," who tries to main-
tain a relatively smooth stream of payments to the private sector (i.e., provide a form of social
insurance) in the face of substantial, non-insurable ¯scal revenue risk and having access only
to a non-state-contingent debt instrument.
Mendoza and Oviedo (2004) show how a simple, partial-equilibrium model of a tormented
insurer that tries to keep ¯scal outlays constant at an exogenous level, given a Markov process
of ¯scal revenues, delivers results that combine the notion of a \natural debt limit" from the
precautionary savings literature with Barro's (1979) prediction regarding the Random Walk
2behavior of public debt in his tax smoothing framework. The government keeps its outlays
constant as long as the history of revenue realizations and the dynamics of debt result in a debt
level above the annuity value of the \worst," or \catastrophic," level of ¯scal revenues, i.e.,
the government's natural debt limit. When, and if, this limit is reached, government outlays
adjust to a \¯scal crisis" or \lowest tolerable"level.1 In the long run, the public debt-GDP
ratio has dynamics that are determined by initial conditions and lacks a well-de¯ned limiting
distribution. Depending on the initial debt ratio, public debt ends up hitting either the natural
debt limit or being retired entirely (with zero debt imposed as a lower bound at which the
government e®ectively rebates its ¯scal revenue to the private sector).
This basic setup cannot say much about procyclical ¯scal policy, since both revenues and
outlays are exogenous, or about the implications of the tormented insurer's behavior for the
private sector's plans, equilibrium allocations, and the overall welfare of the economy. Yet, it
does illustrate the potential for the tormented insurance framework to account for the observed
negative relationship between average debt ratios and the volatility of government revenues:
Governments with more volatile revenues have tighter natural debt limits and, under incom-
plete asset markets, require more precautionary savings, and hence tolerate less debt. This
result suggests also that the traditional approaches to evaluate ¯scal solvency in developing
countries ignoring aggregate uncertainty can be very misleading.
This paper reformulates the tormented insurer's problem in a dynamic, stochastic general
equilibrium framework. The paper focuses in particular on the competitive equilibrium of an
incomplete-markets economy in which the government chooses optimal plans for public debt
and government expenditures facing two exogenous sources of revenue volatility. The ¯rst
source are the cyclical variations in the economy's output. The second source are °uctuations
in an \implied tax" that captures policy shocks a®ecting public revenues as well as shocks
a®ecting key exogenous determinants of ¯scal revenues in developing countries. Among the
latter, °uctuations in real world commodity prices are particularly important because com-
modity exports are a major source of government revenues in many developing nations. The
1This level of outlays can be set to zero without loss of generality. In this case the government's natural
debt limit allows the largest debt and satis¯es the same de¯nition as in Aiyagari (1994). A positive (and more
realistic) crisis level of government outlays results in a tighter natural debt limit, and the limit is tighter the
smaller the cut in outlays, so that countries that are perceived as capable of stronger ¯scal adjustment can
support higher debt ratios.
3government issues one-period, non-state contingent bonds with a return perfectly arbitraged
with the return on foreign bonds of the same type. Domestic agents make optimal consumption
and savings plans facing the volatility of their after-tax income and using as vehicles of saving
domestic public debt and international bonds. In contrast with the basic setup in Mendoza
and Oviedo (2004), the model features well-de¯ned limiting distributions of public and foreign
debt, and yields predictions about the cyclical behavior of the primary balance and government
purchases and the welfare implications of the government's actions.
The model features two forms of asset market incompleteness. The ¯rst one is the standard
\external" asset market incompleteness typical of small open economy models: the economy as
a whole experiences idiosyncratic income °uctuations and has only access to a world market of
non-state-contingent bonds. The second one is \domestic" asset market incompleteness. If the
government could issue state contingent debt, or enact state-contingent, non-distorting taxes,
it could attain a domestic social planner's optimum in which the incomes of the government
and the private sector are pooled (so that the relevant constraint is the resource constraint of
the economy as a whole) and the marginal utilities of public and private spending are equalized
across time and states of nature. In this case, cyclical °uctuations in ¯scal revenues and after-
tax private income would not alter the distribution of wealth between the government and
and the private sector.2 In the tormented insurer's world, however, the implied tax process
splits the economy's income across the private and public sectors, and the government can
only issue non-state-contingent debt. Hence, the ¯scal authority cannot replicate the domestic
social optimum.
The equilibrium of the model is represented in recursive form as a Markov perfect equi-
librium (MPE) so as to provide a mechanism for computing the state-contingent dynamics
of wealth of the private and public sectors. The government (private sector) formulates its
optimal spending and ¯nancing plans taking as given a conjecture of the private sector's (gov-
ernment's) optimal plans, but behaving competitively so that both agents move simultaneously
and take all relevant prices as given. The MPE is attained when the optimal plans chosen by
the government (private sector) are consistent with the conjecture of the government's (private
2Because the ¯rst form of market incompleteness is not eliminated even if the government can issue domestic
debt contingent on ¯scal revenues, this social optimum does not correspond to the Arrow-Debreu complete
markets equilibrium.
4sector's) optimal plans under which the private sector (government) formulates its plans. In
this MPE, °uctuations in ¯scal revenue and after-tax private income change the distribution
of wealth across the private and public sectors.
The quantitative predictions of the model are examined by conducting a set of numerical
experiments calibrated to Mexican data. The results show that the model, when calibrated
to capture the low average and high volatility of Mexico's public revenues, makes progress in
explaining the other three stylized facts that distinguish ¯scal policy in developing countries
from that of industrial nations. In particular, the model replicates the inverse relationship
between average debt ratios and ¯scal revenue volatility found in the data, and generates
GDP correlations for government purchases and the primary balance very similar to the ones
estimated for Mexico.
A comparison of the domestic social optimum with the MPE shows that domestic asset
market incompleteness has important implications for equilibrium allocations and welfare. The
volatility of expenditures is signi¯cantly higher in the MPE than in the social optimum, even
though both result in very similar long-run averages of private and public expenditures, and
this translates into welfare costs of market incompleteness that are several orders of magnitude
larger than standard results in the literature. The costs range from 1.6 to 4.9 percent in terms of
the long-run average of a compensating variation in a time-and-state-invariant level of private
consumption that equates national expected lifetime utility across the social optimum and
the MPE. In the literature, the welfare costs of eliminating asset markets for purposes of
consumption smoothing and/or risk sharing with standard preferences are generally below
1/10th of a percent (see, for example, Lucas (1987) or Mendoza (1991)) .
This paper forms part of a growing literature examining ¯scal policy in environments with
incomplete asset markets, including, among others, the studies by Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent,
and SeppÄ alÄ a (2002), Aguiar, Amador and Gopinath (2005), Celasun, Durdun and Ostry (2005),
Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe (2002), and Yakadina and Kumhof (2005). This paper di®ers in its
focus on the split between domestic vis-µ a-vis international asset market incompleteness, and on
the analysis of optimal debt and expenditure policies for a given stochastic process of revenues
(instead of solving a Ramsey optimal taxation problem). This approach seems more in line
with the developing countries' heavy reliance on commodity exports as a large source of ¯scal
5revenue, and with their limited ability to ¯ne-tune conventional direct and indirect tax rates
with the aim to improve risk sharing.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and characterizes
the equilibrium. Section 3 conducts the quantitative analysis. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a small open economy with stochastic endowment income and limited opportunities
for risk sharing and consumption smoothing because ¯nancial markets are incomplete. This
economy is inhabited by two in¯nitely-lived agents: a representative household and a govern-
ment. The government receives stochastic public revenues that are a®ected by two sources of
uncertainty: °uctuations in the economy's endowment income and °uctuations in an implied
tax rate that represents °uctuations in tax policy and in other key exogenous determinants of
¯scal revenues. The government's total non-interest outlays include current expenditures (i.e.,
purchases of goods and services), which will be chosen optimally, and transfer payments to the
private sector, which are kept at a deterministic, constant level for simplicity. The government
can sell one-period, non-state contingent bonds to the private sector to ¯nance primary ¯scal
de¯cits. On the side of the private sector, households collect stochastic after-tax income, which
is a®ected by the same sources of uncertainty as ¯scal revenues. Households make optimal in-
tertemporal consumption plans and they have access to the domestic market of public bonds
and to a world market of one-period, non-state contingent bonds. These two bonds are perfect
substitutes and the gross real rate of return on both equals R. The combination of market
incompleteness and income uncertainty induces both agents to undertake precautionary saving
in order to self-insure against endowment and tax shocks.
The variables that describe the state of the economy at any point in time are the stock of
public debt, b
g
t¡1, the net foreign asset position, bI






t is the shock to national income and ²¿
t is the implied tax shock. Thus,




The economy's endowment income, yt exp(²
y
t), is the product of a deterministic trend com-
ponent, yt, and a cyclical component, exp(²
y
t). The trend component grows at the constant,
6exogenous, gross rate ° and all equilibrium allocations follow this common trend. Following
Carroll (2004), the analysis focuses, without loss of generality, on a detrended representation
of the model in which: (a) all allocations are expressed as ratios of yt, and (b) the subjective
discount factor and the gross return on assets are adjusted so that the solutions of the de-
trended model can be mapped into the equivalent solutions of the growing economy.3 These
adjustments imply an e®ective discount factor given by ¯°1¡¾, where ¯ is the subjective dis-
count factor and ¾ is the coe±cient of relative risk aversion, and an e®ective gross return on
assets R ´ R=°.
The implied tax will be calibrated so that, taking GDP as the overall tax base, the stochastic
process of total public revenues in the model matches one taken from actual data. The implied
tax rate is ¿ exp(²¿
t) and it includes an average tax rate ¿ as a share of GDP and an implied tax
shock exp(²¿
t). Note that, to the extent that this shock re°ects the e®ect on public revenues
of °uctuations in world commodity prices, it is analogous to a terms-of-trade shock.
The shocks to GDP and implied taxes are represented by a joint Markov process de¯ned
by an NS £ 2 matrix E containing NS realizations of the pair ² = (²y;²¿) and an NS £ NS
transition probability matrix P with typical element Pij = Prob(²t = ²jj²t¡1 = ²i), where
i;j = 1;:::;NS index the NS realizations of the pair ², and
PNS
j=1 Pij = 1, 8i = 1;:::;NS.
2.1 The Government's Problem
















; ¾ 6= 1; ¾ > 0 (1a)
subject to the following government budget constraint:










3Carroll also shows how to generalize this setup to include i.i.d. shocks to the trend component, which
would add to the model permanent shocks as those studied by Aguiar and Gopinath (2004).
7where gt represents government expenditures at time t, z are time-and-state-invariant transfer
payments to the private sector, R is the growth-adjusted interest rate, and b
g
t is the stock of
public debt chosen at time t. The budget constraint (1b) states that total government outlays,
consisting of expenditures, transfers, and gross debt repayments, must not exceed the total
government resources, consisting of issues of new debt and ¯scal revenues.
Given that the marginal utility of public expenditures goes to in¯nity as gt approaches
zero from above, the government never chooses a plan that leaves it exposed to the risk of
facing less than strictly positive expenditures in all dates and states of nature. As a result,
the government imposes on itself a \natural debt limit," which is given by the annuity value
of the lowest Markov realization of ¯scal revenues net of transfers
min[exp(²y)¿ exp(²¿)]¡z
R¡1 . This
upper bound on debt is exactly analogous to the concept of the natural debt limit introduced
by Aiyagari (1994) in the heterogenous agents-precautionary savings literature. Following
Aiyagari, the debt constraint faced by the government can be expressed more generally as an





min[exp(²y)¿ exp(²¿)] ¡ z
R ¡ 1
(1c)
Hence, the government's debt constraint can be set at the natural debt limit, or at an arbitrarily
tighter limit, which Aiyagari (1994) labeled an ad-hoc debt limit. This ad-hoc debt limit can be
justi¯ed as a form of natural debt limit implied by a constraint requiring government purchases
not to fall below an exogenous minimum level at any date and state of nature.
Mendoza and Oviedo (2004) show that the government's natural debt limit also implies
a credible commitment to remain \able" to repay (i.e., to have enough resources to repay)
the debt at all times. This is because the natural debt limit represents the stock of debt the
government can honor even if it draws the worst realization of ¯scal revenue \almost surely."
Mendoza and Oviedo obtain this debt limit as an exogenous requirement that an e®ectual
insurer, de¯ned as one that keeps government outlays smooth for the longest possible time,
would want to meet. In this case, allowing situations where debt could exceed this limit would





probability of occurrence under which the government cannot repay its debt even by setting
8gT = 0 at some date T. In the model of this paper, the CRRA form of the government's payo®
function enforces the natural debt limit as an endogenous feature of the model.
The optimality conditions of the government's problem are the budget constraint (1b), the















t is the non-negative Lagrange multiplier on the debt constraint. The above Euler
equation has the standard interpretation of equating the marginal cost and bene¯t of sacri¯cing
a unit of public expenditures at date t, with the caveat that if the debt constraint binds the
multiplier in the right-hand-side is positive. Note, however, that when Ág is set equal to the
natural debt limit, the CRRA utility function implies that ¹
g
t = 0 at equilibrium for all t.
2.2 The Household's Problem
The household 's problem is analogous to the government's problem, except that the household
is the holder of the public debt and can also trade in the world's bond market. The represen-


















subject to the following budget constraint:












t¡1) + z (2b)
This budget constraint restricts the sum of consumption, an exogenous, invariant level of
private absorption x (which is used in the calibration to represent investment expenditures),
and purchases of public and foreign bonds not to exceed the household's resources. The latter
are given by the sum of after-tax private income, ¯nancial income, and government transfers.
Since the household's payo® function has the same CRRA form as the government's, the




given by the annuity value of the lowest Markov realization of after tax income, adjusted to
add transfers and subtract x. Alternatively, for a given Markov plan of domestic public debt
given by the policy function b
g
t = ^ bg(bg;bI;²), the household faces a natural limit on external







exp(²y)[1 ¡ ¿ exp(²¿)] + Rbg ¡ bg0(bg;bI;²)
¤
+ z ¡ x
R ¡ 1
(2c)
The right-most expression in this constraint is the natural debt limit on foreign debt. Hence,
condition (2c) allows for the external debt constraint to be set at its natural debt limit or at
a tighter ad-hoc debt limit. As before, the ad-hoc debt limit can be thought of as implied by
an exogenous constraint requiring consumption never to fall below a pre-determined minimum
level.
The optimality conditions of the private sector are the budget constraint (2b), the external














t is the non-negative Lagrange multiplier on the external debt constraint that, as in
the case of the government, is equal to zero for all t if ÁI is set at the natural debt limit. This
Euler equation is also standard, with the caveat of the multiplier on the borrowing constraint,
and it states that the private sector equates the marginal bene¯t and cost of an additional unit
of consumption expenditures.
Given the perfect substitutability between b
g
t and bI
t, the household is indi®erent between the
two assets and their returns are perfectly arbitraged. Still, the composition of the household's
portfolio is well de¯ned at equilibrium because the government has a well-de¯ned supply of
debt that it desires to issue each period. In general, the government is indi®erent between
placing this debt at home or abroad, since the interest rate is the same, but the model assumes
that all domestic debt is held by domestic residents. Except for the dynamics of net foreign
assets, this assumption is innocuous because the government could be viewed as placing any
fraction µ of its debt abroad, and the household would then formulate optimal plans for total
10assets bt = bI
t +(1¡µ)b
g
t. This reformulation of the problem would yield identical expenditure
allocations for both agents and the same levels of welfare. Foreign and domestic debt markets
could be segmented by introducing additional frictions into the ¯nancial setup of the model,
but the aim of the analysis is to highlight the implications of the incompleteness of asset
markets than emerge in the tormented insurer's framework even when domestic public debt
and foreign bonds are perfect substitutes.
The payo® functions of the government and the private sector do not depend directly on
each other's actions. An alternative formulation could introduce public expenditures (or a
fraction of them) in the private utility function to explore a richer set of strategic interactions.
If the household's utility function is separable in public and private expenditures, and the
assumptions of non-distorting taxation and simultaneous moves are maintained, the optimal
plans would be the same as in the current speci¯cation. Another interesting extension would
be to explore di®erent discount rates across the private and public sectors in order to capture
the fact that governments generally have shorter life horizons than private agents.
2.3 Competitive Equilibrium
De¯nition (CE) The competitive equilibrium of the economy is characterized by stochastic
sequences representing the allocations of private and public expenditures, government debt,













t=0 solve the household's problem.
iii) The following economy-wide resource constraint holds:







2.4 Markov Perfect Equilibrium
Solving for the above competitive equilibrium is di±cult because the incompleteness of asset
markets prevents the private and public sectors from pooling risk, and as a result the equilib-
11rium cannot be represented as the solution to a social planner's problem. The non-insurable
shocks faced by the private and public sectors lead to °uctuations in the \domestic distribution
of wealth" (i.e. the wealth distribution of the government vis-µ a-vis the private sector). These
°uctuations, and the implied absence of risk pooling across the two sectors, are re°ected in
°uctuations in the ratio of marginal utilities of expenditures, or, given the CRRA structure of
preferences, in the ratio ct=gt:
Under these conditions, solving for the competitive equilibrium requires adopting a solu-
tion strategy that can capture the state-contingent wealth dynamics accurately. The strategy
adopted here is to solve for the equilibrium as a Markov perfect equilibrium where the govern-
ment and the private sector behave competitively by taking all relevant prices as given and by
making simultaneous moves. Each agent formulates optimal plans taking as given a conjecture
of the other agent's optimal plans, and the agents do not internalize the e®ect of their actions
on each other's choices. The equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium of a two-player dynamic game
with uncertainty. The solution strategy involves representing the game in recursive form and
solving for its equilibrium by backward induction.
The two agent's optimization problems are expressed in recursive form as follows. At
the beginning of each period, agents observe the state of the economy s = (bg;bI;²). The
state space of the Markov shocks includes the NS possible realizations of the pair ² =
(²y;²¿) de¯ned earlier. The state space of domestic and external debt is de¯ned by dis-
crete grids with NBG and NBI nodes respectively. Hence, the state space of public debt
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NBG = Ágg and the one for net foreign assets is bI 2 BI =
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. Each agent takes as given a conjectured decision rule for the
other agent's optimal plans. The government conjectures that the household's decision rule
is bI0 = ~ bI(bg;bI;²) and the household conjectures that the government's decision rule is
bg0 = ~ bg(bg;bI;²). Given these, each agent ¯nds an optimal decision rule that solves the
Bellman equation representing their individual optimization problems.




























The solution to this dynamic programming problem yields a decision rule for the government's
debt ^ bg(bg;bI;²).
































The solution to this dynamic programming problem yields a decision rule for the private sector
^ bI(bg;bI;²).
De¯nition (MPE) A Markov perfect equilibrium for the small open economy is a pair of
value functions V and W; a pair of decision rules ^ bg and ^ bI; and a pair of conjectures ~ bg and
~ bI such that:
i) Given the conjecture ~ bI, V solves the Bellman equation (4), and ^ bg is the associated
optimal policy rule.
ii) Given the conjecture ~ bg, W solves the Bellman equation (5), and ^ bI is the associated
optimal policy rule.
iii) The conjectured and optimal decision rules satisfy ^ bg(¢) = ~ bg(¢), and ^ bI(¢) = ~ bI(¢)
Conditions i) to iii) imply that, at equilibrium, each agent's conjecture of the other agent's
optimal decisions matches the decisions that the other agent actually ¯nds optimal to choose.
Note that the computation of this MPE is simpli¯ed by the fact that, while the government's
13actions a®ect the household's dynamic programming problem, the household's choices do not
a®ect the government's optimal plans. Hence, the MPE can be computed by solving ¯rst the
government's Bellman equation, and then imposing the resulting public debt decision rule on
the household's problem. This feature of the model follows from the lack of feedback from
actions of the private sector on the government's payo® and constraints, which in turn results
from the simplifying assumptions making ¯scal revenues independent of the actions of the
private sector.4 The rationale for these assumptions is to show that even in this case, in which
the strategic interaction between the two agents is simpli¯ed substantially, the incompleteness
of domestic ¯nancial markets has important consequences. Extending the analysis to the case
in which there is two-way feedback between the government's and the private sector's plans is
straightforward, albeit computationally intensive.
It is straightforward to show that a Markov perfect equilibrium, if it exists, is a competitive
equilibrium for the small open economy. Consider ¯rst the Bellman equations (4) and (5).
Using the standard Benveniste-Sheinkman equation, it follows that the ¯rst order conditions of
the Bellman equations imply that the Euler equations of the competitive equilibrium, eqs. (1d)
and (2d), hold. Finally, the budget constraints of the Bellman equations yield the economy-
wide resource constraint (3) of the competitive equilibrium.
2.5 Domestic Social Optimum
As explained in the Introduction, the main distortion preventing the tormented insurer from
implementing ¯scal policies that support perfect risk pooling across the private and public
sectors is the incompleteness of domestic asset markets. The quantitative analysis of the
next section explores the e®ects of this distortion on allocations and welfare by comparing
the outcome of the MPE with that of a social optimum in which domestic asset markets are
assumed to be rich enough to support perfect domestic risk pooling. The domestic economy as
a whole still faces incomplete markets vis-µ a-vis the rest of the world because GDP °uctuations
still represent non-insurable, idiosyncratic income shocks for the small open economy.
4For example, if the government taxes consumption, the consumption decisions of the private sector would
a®ect the government budget constraint, and hence the two Bellman equations would need to be solved simul-
taneously.
14The social planner's problem that yields the domestic social optimum is similar to the
standard Negishi-Mantel social planner's representation of the complete markets equilibrium as
a weighted sum of individual utilities subject to the resource constraint. The only key di®erence
is that, because the international asset markets remain incomplete, the outcome of the social
planner's problem de¯ned here does not correspond to the complete-markets equilibrium of the
small open economy. The domestic social optimum is de¯ned as the sequences of allocations
fct;gtg1























where ´ > 0 and (1 ¡ ´) are the weights assigned to the private and public sector payo®s
respectively, subject to the small open economy's resource constraint:













where the quotient in the right-hand-side of this borrowing constraint is the social planner's
natural debt limit.
In this equilibrium with perfect domestic risk pooling, the marginal utilities of public
and private expenditures are equalized across states and over time. Given CRRA utility










Note that ct and gt still °uctuate because the external market incompleteness still exists and
it does not allow the small open economy to fully insure away its macroeconomic risk.




























subject to the resource constraint (6b) and the external debt constraint (6c).
If the government had access to state contingent tax or debt instruments, it could implement
the above domestic social optimum as a competitive equilibrium. State contingent taxes could
work as follows: Assume that the public and private debt limits are set at their natural
debt limits, public debt is set to zero at all times, and the government introduces a set of







t)), where starred variables
represent optimal allocations of the social planner's problem. This policy would support the
social optimum because: (a) fg¤
tg
1
t=0 would satisfy the government budget constraint and






t=0 would satisfy the private sector's budget
constraint and its Euler equation; and (c) the resource constraint holds. That the Euler
equations are satis¯ed is obvious from the fact that the same Euler equations hold for the
social planner. The government budget constraint obviously holds given the de¯nition of the






t=0 because the resource
constraint holds for the social optimum, the government's budget constraint holds, and there
is no public debt.
Similarly, the social optimum could be obtained as a competitive equilibrium with a policy
setting income taxes to zero and issuing state-contingent public debt (i.e., domestic one-period
Arrow securities) to e®ectively implement state contingent lump-sum taxes LSTt = g¤
t + z:
This policy would tax away from households, in a lump-sum fashion, exactly the resources














satis¯es its Euler equation and the lump-sum tax leaves just enough disposable income for the








The numerical solutions to the MPE are obtained by iterating to convergence on the Bellman
equations (4) and (5) on the discrete state space containing NBG possible public debt posi-
tions, NBI possible net foreign asset positions, and NS pairs of income and tax shocks. The
algorithm is executed using NBG=200, NBI=200, and NS=9, so the discrete state space is
of dimension 200 £ 200 £ 9.5 As long as there is no feedback from the private sector choices
to the government's Bellman equation, the algorithm can be simpli¯ed by solving ¯rst the
government's problem as a stand-alone value-function-iteration problem, and then using the
resulting optimal decision rule for public debt as the conjectured decision rule for the same
variable in the Bellman equation of the private sector.
3.1 Baseline Calibration
The quantitative analysis uses a baseline calibration to Mexican data at an annual frequency.
The calibration has two components. First, a Markov representation of the stochastic process
of output and implied taxes observed in the data. Second, a set of parameter values set so
that long-run averages of variables in the model match their counterparts in Mexican data, or
taken as standard from the Real Business Cycle (RBC) literature. Table 1 summarizes the
calibration parameters.
The joint Markov process driving the shocks to endowment income and implied taxes is
constructed using annual data for Mexico's real GDP and total ¯scal revenues for the period
1980-2004. The implied tax-rate series, TX, is constructed by computing the ratio of total
public revenue to GDP. The data for GDP and TX are then expressed in per capita terms,
logged, and detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter to obtain their cyclical components,
d GDP and d TX. Panel (a) of Table 2 reports the unconditional moments of these two time series.
The joint process driving the endowment and implied tax shocks is obtained by estimating a
VAR(1), b Xt = © b Xt¡1 + ³t, where b Xt = ( d GDP t; d TXt)0, © is the 2£2 matrix of autocorrelation
coe±cients, and ³t is an i.i.d. random vector with covariance matrix §³. The estimation results
5We explore the robustness of the results to enlarging the state space or conforming it with ¯ner grids by
solving the model with a state space of dimensions 400 £ 400 £ 9. The results are largely robust, with the
ergodic means, standard deviations, and autocorrelations di®ering by at most 5 percent.























Since the MPE is solved using a discrete state space, the VAR representation of the shocks
needs to be converted into a discrete Markov process. This is done using Tauchen's (1991)
quadrature method, setting the Markov chain to carry nine pairs of shocks to GDP and taxes
(i.e., nine states in total). Given that the o®-diagonal elements of ^ © are not statistically
di®erent from zero, we use the diagonal version of ^ © and ^ §³ as inputs for Tauchen's algorithm.
The resulting set of Markov realizations and their associated long-run probabilities are reported
in the Appendix. Panel (b) of Table 2 shows the unconditional moments of GDP and taxes
produced by the Markov chain. These do not match exactly the moments from the data
in Panel (a) because of the approximation error of the Markov chain with 9 states, but the
standard deviation, correlation and autocorrelation coe±cients are close to their empirical
counterparts.7
The growth rate is set to ° = 1:00888, which is the average growth rate of Mexico's real
GDP per capita between 1980 and 2000 computed using data from the World Bank's World
Development Indicators. In the same source and sample, the average investment-GDP ratio
yields x = 0:226. The mean income tax rate is set to ¿ = 0:256, which is the 1980-2002 average
ratio of total public revenue to GDP using data at current prices from Mexico's INEGI Bank of
Economic Information (available at http://dgcnesyp.inegi.gob.mx/cgi-win/bdieintsi.exe). The
time-invariant government transfers are set at z = 0:111, which is the di®erence between the
average ratio of total non-interest government outlays to GDP (from the same INEGI source)
and the average government expenditures-GDP ratio, g = 0:0978, from World Development
Indicators.
6t-statistics are shown in parenthesis.
7The approximation improves as NS, but at a high cost in computing time. The drawback of working with
a limited number of states is that, by construction, natural debt limits are produced with the lowest realizations
of income supported by the Markov chain, and the extent to which these realizations re°ect adverse outcomes
that are truly relevant (i.e., that have nontrivial probability) depends on the number of states in the chain.
18The real interest rate is set to R = 1:0986, which is the average EMBI+ real return on
Mexican sovereign debt for the 1994-2002 period computed using the data from Neumeyer and
Perri (2005). This rate includes both the risk-free rate as well as the default risk premium. The
model does not consider default explicitly, but using an interest rate that is more representative
of the actual rate at which the Mexican government borrows is more reasonable than simply
applying the real rate on U.S. T-bills.
Regarding preference parameters, the value of the coe±cient of relative risk aversion is
¾ = 2; which is the usual value in RBC models. Unlike in the RBC literature, however,
the subjective discount factor ¯ cannot be set simply to match the inverse of the growth-
adjusted gross interest rate because precautionary savings makes asset holdings diverge to
in¯nity in this case, as agents try to attain a non-stochastic consumption stream in the face
of non-diversi¯able income shocks. In models without long-run growth (see Aiyagari (1994),
Huggett (1993), and Ljungqvuist and Sargent (2004, ch. 17)), the condition ¯R < 1 yields
a well-de¯ned unique invariant distribution of asset holdings. In models with growth, Carroll
(2004) shows that the condition required to prevent asset holdings from diverging to in¯nity
is ¯R £ max[(1=R)¾;(1=°)¾] < 1.
Precautionary savings also implies that the averages of the model's stochastic stationary
state vary with the choice of parameters, particularly those that appear in Carroll's condition,
the Markov process of shocks, and the choice of Ág. Figure 5 shows the response of the
mean level of public debt in the MPE to increments in ¯ that make the expression ¯R £
max[(1=R)¾;(1=°)¾] in Carroll's condition converge to 1 from below. The graph is constructed
for three values of ¾ (2, 3 and 5) and using the described Markov process of shocks. The
values of R and ° set above, and it maintains Ág equal to the government's natural debt limit
obtained using (1c). The ¯gure is plotted with the horizontal axis inverted to show that it
yields the same concave relationship as the Aiyagari-Hugget class of models (with the elasticity
of average public \assets" going to in¯nity as ¯ increases).8
Since each long-run average of public debt has an associated average level of public expen-
ditures through the government budget constraint, it follows that the higher the average of
8Formally, public debt should go to -1 as Carroll's condition approaches 1 from below. Since the upper
bound of public debt is set to zero, however, the entire mass of the ergodic distribution of debt concentrates
at this upper bound as ¯ raises to levels for which Carroll's condition is \close enough" to 1.
19public debt in Figure 5, the lower the corresponding average of government expenditures (as
more resources are allocated to the debt service). The baseline calibration uses this result to
set the value of ¯. In particular, ¯ is set such that, given the calibrated values of R, ° and
¾ and with Ág set at the government's natural debt limit, Carroll's condition for the model
to have a well-de¯ned stochastic steady state holds and the long-run average of government
purchases equals Mexico's average of 9.78 percent of GDP. The resulting value is ¯ = 0:925
(for which Carroll's condition yields ¯R°¡¾ = 0:9984 < 1):
The grids of public debt and foreign assets can now be speci¯ed using the information of
the baseline calibration. The upper bound of the public debt grid is its natural debt limit.
Given the values of R, °, z and the lowest realization of government revenue supported by the
states of income and tax shocks in the Markov process, equation (1c) yields b
g
200 = Ág = 1:318
(or about 132 percent of GDP). The lower bound of public debt is set to zero (b
g
1 = 0) which
implies that the government cannot become a net creditor (i.e., hold negative debt positions).
This constraint binds with 0.51 percent probability in the long run.
Given the optimal decision rule for public debt, the values of R, °, z and x, and the lowest
realization of private disposable income (de¯ned as exp(²y)[1 ¡ ¿ exp(²¿)]+Rbg ¡bg0(bg;bI;²))
supported by the states in the Markov process, equation (2c) yields a natural debt limit on
net foreign assets of -7.105 (more than 7 times larger than GDP). However, the MPE obtained
with such a large maximum external debt ratio yields an average foreign debt ratio that is
also too large (at 200 percent of GDP), and consequently the corresponding long-run average
consumption ratio is too low relative to the average in Mexican data (53 percent in the MPE
v. 66.9 percent in the data). Hence, instead of using the natural debt limit for the lower bound
of external assets, we set an ad-hoc debt limit such that the baseline MPE yields an average
private consumption ratio consistent with the data. The ad-hoc debt limit that satis¯es this
criterion is bI
1 = ÁI = ¡0:5. The upper bound for bI is chosen so that its long-run probability
is approximately zero (without any binding constraint) and has no e®ect on the moments of
the ergodic distribution. The resulting upper bound is bI
200 = 0:1.
203.2 Cyclical Co-movements in the Baseline Calibration
Table 3 shows the statistical moments that characterize cyclical co-movements in the ergodic
distribution of the MPE. All moments in the table correspond to the model's detrended vari-
ables, which are ratios relative to GDP. The mean value of GNP is lower than that for GDP
(which by construction is equal to 1) because the economy is paying interest to the rest of the
world on a stock of net foreign assets of about 36 percent of GDP (in line with the estimates
for Mexico obtained by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (1999)). This debt position and the value of
R, imply that the economy runs a trade surplus of 3.2 percent of GDP on average in the long
run. The average public debt ratio is equal to 53 percent of GDP, and hence the mean total
asset position of the household (i.e., E[b
g
t + bI
t]) is equal to 17 percent of GDP.
Figures 6.a and 6.b show the limiting distributions of public debt and international assets.
These ¯gures show that the support of the equilibrium allocations of public debt and net
external assets di®er sharply from the corresponding debt limits. The long-run mean of public
debt (external assets), is 79 (14) percentage points lower (higher) than its natural debt limit.
The substantial di®erence between the mean of public debt and the government's natural debt
limit shows that it is optimal for a government acting as a tormented insurer not to use a
large portion of its borrowing capacity on average. There are non-zero-probability histories of
exogenous adverse revenue outcomes that can lead the government to hold large amounts of
debt in the stochastic steady state, of up to 130 percent of GDP, but the endogenous probability
of observing these outcomes is very low (see Figure 6.a). Outcomes with higher debt ratios are
not consistent with optimal behavior in the economy's long-run competitive equilibrium.
The variability and co-movement indicators in Table 3 illustrate the challenges that the
private and public sectors face in trying to smooth consumption in the competitive equilibrium
of this economy with incomplete markets. Private consumption is more volatile than after-tax
income and government expenditures are more volatile than ¯scal revenues. On the other
hand, the correlations of private and public expenditures with the relevant income measures
(after-tax income and ¯scal revenues respectively) are quite low, so precautionary savings does
help agents lower the correlation between their incomes and their expenditures in the long run.
Still, because asset markets are incomplete, they cannot fully hedge idiosyncratic income risk,
21and they end up enduring higher levels of variability for expenditures than for incomes, even
though the correlations between expenditures and incomes are low.
The e®ects of imperfect risk pooling are also be observed in the relative variability of private
and public expenditures. If the government had access to state-contingent ¯scal instruments,
the ratio of private to public expenditures would be constant across time and states of nature.
In contrast, in the model's competitive equilibrium the coe±cient of variation of government
expenditures is nearly 6 times larger than that for private consumption. The coe±cient of
variation of the ratio gt=ct itself is 33 percent.
The low, positive correlation between GDP and government expenditures (at 0.02) matches
the estimate of this correlation observed in the data (see Appendix Table 5 in Kaminsky et
al. (2004)). As noted in the Introduction, this pattern of non-negative correlations between
government purchases and GDP is one of the de¯ning features of the puzzling phenomenon of
procyclical ¯scal in developing economies. For the United States, for example, Kaminsky et
al. report an estimate of the same correlation of -0.37, and the average of their estimates for
G7 countries is about -0.2.
The model is also able to replicate a second key feature of procyclical ¯scal policies in
developing countries: the primary ¯scal balance is nearly uncorrelated with output, instead
of displaying the marked positive correlations observed in industrial countries. Alesina and
Tabellini (2005) estimate regressions of the (di®erenced) primary balance-GDP ratio on the
cyclical components of GDP and terms of trade, and the lagged primary balance-GDP ratio,
and ¯nd that the \beta" coe±cients on GDP are signi¯cantly higher for industrial economies
than for developing countries. The average of their beta coe±cients for industrial OECD
countries is 0.26, while their average for Latin American and the Caribbean is -0.13 (see Table
1 of Alessina and Tabellini's paper). Their beta coe±cient for Mexico is -0.094. Using a long
stochastic simulation of the model's decision rules to generate data for 20,000 periods, and
estimating the analog of their regression, the model produces a beta coe±cient of 0.097 (with a
negligible standard error of 0.00326). It is di±cult to assess the accuracy of this match between
the betas produced by the model and the data because Alessina and Tabellini do not report
country-speci¯c standard errors. They do note that their beta coe±cients have generally large
standard errors, and that many of the developing country betas are not statistically di®erent
22from zero. Hence, this suggests that it is possible that again the model matches not just the
general feature that developing countries tend to have betas much closer to zero than industrial
countries, but that the model could match closely Mexico's true beta.
The autocorrelations of public debt and net foreign assets are very close to 1, and in
addition, public and private expenditures are highly serially correlated. These results are
consistent with the high autocorrelation of assets typical of models of incomplete markets
and precautionary saving with non-state-contingent assets, and they are also in line with the
¯ndings of Aiyagari et al. (2002), who found that the solution to the Ramsey optimal taxation
problem with incomplete markets and exogenous government expenditures yields near-random-
walk behavior in optimal taxes and debt. Here, tax revenue is exogenous and hence optimal
public expenditures, instead of optimal taxes, and debt display near-unit-root behavior.9 As
Aiyagari et al. also note, the high autocorrelation of public debt is a feature that is in line
with the predictions of Barro's (1979) classic work on tax smoothing.
It is interesting to compare the outcome of the model's competitive equilibrium with the
predictions of the simpler partial equilibrium model of Mendoza and Oviedo (2004). In the
partial equilibrium setup, the government keeps outlays constant at an exogenous ad-hoc level,
except when a su±ciently long sequence of adverse revenue realizations puts the economy in a
state of \¯scal crisis", at which the natural debt limit binds and the ¯scal authority therefore
cuts its outlays to an ad-hoc crisis level. In that setup, given a Markov process of revenue
realizations, simulated time paths of public debt always diverge eventually to either zero (i.e.,
the no-assets constraint) or to the natural debt limit, depending on the initial debt ratio {truly
matching Barro's (1979) result stating that the long-run behavior of debt is fully determined
by initial conditions.
Unfortunately, the partial equilibrium setup of Mendoza and Oviedo does not support a
well-de¯ned long-run distribution of debt, and as a result it is of limited use for assessing the
long-run dynamics of public debt. In contrast, the competitive equilibrium of the model of
9Aiyagari et al. also need limits on government assets (i.e., negative debt) to recover Barro's predictions,
because otherwise the optimal taxes are set to zero an all expenditures are ¯nanced with a large enough \war
chest" of precautionary savings. In contrast, the model of this paper needs only to satisfy Carroll's stationarity
condition to have a well-de¯ned ergodic distribution of assets. Limits on government assets are required only
if one is interested in particular long-run equilibria that match particular features of the data (as was the case
in the baseline calibration that uses the natural debt limit as a lower bound for debt and 0 as an upper bound
to match the observed average GDP share of government expenditures).
23this paper has a unique, invariant limiting distribution. When perturbed by an initial shock,
all endogenous (detrended) variables eventually revert to their means as the e®ect of the shock
vanishes. The unique distribution yields precise predictions about the long-run moments and
the time-series dynamics of public debt, and the rest of the model's endogenous variables, in the
long-run and the short-run for any given set of initial conditions. It is also true, however, that
the near-random-walk patterns of public debt, net foreign assets, and expenditures imply that
the mean-reverting dynamics of these variables can take a very long time after an exogenous
shock to GDP or implied taxes hits the economy.
Figures 7.a and 7.b plot the Markov forecast functions of public debt and net foreign assets
starting from the mean value of the latter and an initial public debt ratio of 0.634, roughly 10
percentage points above the mean in the ergodic distribution. The plots show nine forecast
functions (i.e., non-linear impulse responses conditional on the initial asset ratios and a date-0
pair of shocks) corresponding to each of the nine pairs of shocks in the states of the Markov
chain of GDP and implied tax shocks. Thus, each plot has nine forecast functions, one for
each of the nine possible initial states: s =(b
g
0 = 0:634, bI
0 =E[bI];²j) for j = 1;::;9. Although
the nine forecast functions start at bg = 0:634, which is visually imperceptible in the graph
given that the time horizon goes through t = 2000, the nine realizations of ² give rise to nine
di®erent values of bg in the second period of the ¯gure. One way to interpret these forecast
functions is to view them as plotting the expected responses of public debt and foreign assets
given a date-0 unanticipated shock (e.g. the rescue of failing banks) that puts the stock of
public debt 10 percentage points above its long-run average.
Figures 7.a and 7.b illustrate the e®ects of the high persistence of assets discussed above,
in the form of the very low speed of convergence of the public debt and net foreign asset
ratios to their corresponding long-run averages. This is near-Random-Walk behavior, but is
clearly not a true Random Walk, as in Barro (1979), because the competitive equilibrium of
the tormented insurer model features a unique invariant distribution of assets, even though
the e®ects of purely transitory shocks on asset holdings can take very long to fade away.
Figure 8 shows a sample of 10 simulated time series of the public debt-GDP ratio for
the same starting state s0 described above. For each simulation, a 50-period time series of
realizations of ²t is drawn from the Markov matrix of realizations E detailed in the Appendix.
24As the length of the simulations grows su±ciently large, the expected value of b
g
t computed with
each of the 10 time series converges to the mean public debt ratio in the limiting distribution.
As each time series °uctuates over time, however, the e®ect of the high persistence of asset
holdings is re°ected in the wide range of debt ratios that are consistent with the competitive
equilibrium starting from the same initial conditions.
Figures 9-11 show impulse-response functions to tax and GDP shocks constructed by es-
timating a standard, unrestricted VAR(1) model using data generated from the model in a
stochastic time-series simulation that runs for 20,100 periods, discarding the ¯rst 100 periods.
This simulation uses the optimal asset accumulation rules of the MPE and the Markov chain
of the exogenous shocks. The impulse response functions show responses to Cholesky one-
standard-deviation, positive innovations to the tax and GDP processes starting from initial
conditions equal, by construction, to the averages of public debt and foreign assets.
Figure 9 shows the impulse responses of the gt=ct ratio for tax and output shocks. The
plots are truncated at 20 periods, even though if plotted for a su±ciently long sample, the two
of them return to the zero line because of the mean-reverting nature of the model's stochastic
steady state. Both a positive output and a positive tax shock raise the gt=ct ratio above the
long-run mean; but the impact e®ect of a tax shock is around 10 times larger than that of the
output shock, and the di®erence gets larger before beginning its slow-moving reversion to the
zero line. These results re°ect the fact that the positive output shock increases the incomes
of both the private and public sector, but the tax shock moves the two agent's incomes in
opposite directions. Hence, the tax shock implies larger foregone opportunities for e±cient
risk sharing because of the incompleteness of asset markets. Government revenues rise while
private disposable income falls, and this opposing moves result in persistent di®erences in
expenditure patterns that imply relatively higher (lower) government (private) expenditures
for a long period of time. In contrast, the domestic social optimum would imply a constant
gt=ct ratio, which corresponds to the zero line in Figure 9.
Figure 10 provides further details on the impulse response functions of the rest of the
model's endogenous variables to a positive tax shock. Public debt and net foreign assets
exhibit highly persistent declines. Private consumption declines on impact and then recovers
very gradually, while public expenditures rise on impact and continue to increase until they level
25o® about 6 periods after the tax shock hits. The current account falls as private agents borrow
to moderate the consumption e®ect of the adverse shock to disposable income. Conversely,
the primary ¯scal balance increases on impact and then falls gradually, as the government
reacts to its positive revenue shock by saving to transfer part of its extra income for future
expenditures. The persistence of the e®ects shown in the impulse response functions of assets
and expenditures illustrate once more the wealth e®ects induced by the incompleteness of asset
markets. The tax shock plays no role in the domestic social optimum, since the social planner
pools the income of the public and private sectors, thus e®ectively providing full insurance
against pure implied tax shocks, so again the zero line is the relevant point for comparing the
responses of the competitive equilibrium with those of the social optimum.
Figure 11 shows the impulse-response functions that follow a positive, one-standard-deviation
innovation to the output process in the competitive equilibrium and the domestic social op-
timum. The output shock is non-insurable risk for both economies, because both have access
to the same set of incomplete international asset markets. Hence, the output shock does not
result in large di®erences in the responses of macroeconomic variables. Still, the plots show
that the wealth e®ects of the asset market incompleteness are not exactly identical in the two
economies. In particular, private consumption (public consumption) is always lower (higher)
in the competitive equilibrium than in the social optimum. Note also that public expendi-
tures increase on impact, illustrating again the procyclical pattern of government purchases
predicted by the model.
3.3 Welfare Costs of the Tormented Insurer's Problem
This section compares the competitive equilibrium allocation and welfare resulting from the
MPE with those produced by the domestic social optimum. Welfare comparisons are conducted
following the approach introduced by Lucas (1987), which is based on computing compensating
variations in time- and state-invariant (i.e., stationary) consumption levels that represent par-
ticular levels of expected lifetime utility under alternative environments (in this case, between
the MPE and the domestic social optimum). The aim is to convert the ordinal units of the
payo® functions into cardinal measures that can be used for quantitative welfare comparisons.
To construct the welfare measure for the domestic social optimum, de¯ne · cSO(bg;bI;²) as a
26stationary consumption function that represents the collective welfare of the public and private
sectors. This welfare measure satis¯es:10
· cSO(bg;bI;²)1¡¾





A comparable measure of collective welfare of the two sectors in the MPE is constructed
by de¯ning the stationary consumption function ¹ cMPE(bg;bI;²) that satis¯es the following
condition:
¹ cMPE(bg;bI;²)1¡¾
(1 ¡ ¾)(1 ¡ ¯)





where V and W are the value functions de¯ned in (4) and (5). There are also stationary
consumption functions that measure the individual welfare of each sector, and these are given
by the function ¹ g(bg;bI;²)that yields the same payo® as V (bg;bI;²) and the function ¹ c(bg;bI;²)
that yields the same payo® as W(bg;bI;²).
The welfare costs of the domestic asset market incompleteness are measured by the per-
centage di®erence between · cSO(bg;bI;²) and ¹ cMPE(bg;bI;²). The minimum and maximum
di®erences across the 360,000 triples (bg;bI;²) in the state space are 0.0007 and 41.45 percent
respectively. These are di±cult to interpret, however, because they do not take into account
the long-run probability of the particular coordinate in the state space to which they corre-
spond. Hence, it makes more sense to evaluate welfare e®ects by comparing expected welfare
costs computed using the limiting distributions of the MPE or the domestic social optimum.














1 (bg;bI;²) is the endogenous ergodic distribution of public debt, foreign assets and
the Markov shocks in the MPE. The second alternative measure of expected welfare costs uses
the limiting distribution of the social optimum, ¦SO
1 (bg;bI;²), instead of ¦MPE
1 (bg;bI;²). A
10These welfare-equivalent stationary consumption levels are computed for each pair (bI;²y) in the social
optimum, and for each triple (bg;bI;²) in the MPE. To express the stationary consumption levels of the social
optimum in terms of the state triples of the MPE, note that neither bg nor ²¿ a®ect the social planner's problem
so that · cSO(bg;bI;²) could equivalently be de¯ned as · cSO(bI;²y).
27problem with this second measure is that these probabilities are not de¯ned for the grid Bg,
since public debt does not enter into the social planner's problem. To make this probability
measure cover the state space for all triples (bg;bI;²), the probability of each pair (bI;²) is
distributed evenly across each of the NBG elements of the Bg grid.
The average welfare costs yield striking results. Using the ergodic distribution of the domes-
tic social optimum, the bene¯ts of eliminating the tormented insurer's problem are equivalent
to an increase of 4.9 percent in the trend level of consumption per capita. If we use the ergodic
distribution of the MPE instead, the increment in trend consumption per capita reaches 1.6
percent. These welfare gains from improving risk sharing dwarf the negligible measures of the
bene¯ts of consumption smoothing and risk sharing obtained in standard RBC models, and are
comparable with those obtained in the quantitative analysis of the e±ciency gains of replacing
capital income taxes with consumption taxes (see, for example, Lucas (1996), Mendoza (1991),
Mendoza and Tesar (1998)).
The main reason for the marked di®erence with previous measures of the welfare gains of
risk sharing is that the tormented insurer's problem deviates sharply from the representative
agent environment of the standard RBC models. In the competitive equilibrium examined here,
the income process of the government is signi¯cantly di®erent from that faced by the private
sector, and the two agents can only used non-state-contingent debt to smooth consumption
and self-insure. As a result, the ratio of gt=ct (i.e., the proxy for shifts in the distribution of
wealth between the private and public sectors) °uctuates widely over the business cycle, and
the °uctuations in government expenditures are particularly costly. The latter is due in part
to the fact that the average of gt is nearly 7 times smaller than the average of ct, and the
curvature of the CRRA payo® function with common ¾ parameter, is more pronounced and
yields larger utility changes for the °uctuations in gt.
Table 4 compares the long-run moments of macroeconomic aggregates in the MPE and
the social optimum to o®er more insight on the determinants of the large welfare costs of
imperfect risk sharing in the model. The mean values of the variables are almost identical in
the two economies, so the welfare costs do not arise because the social planner has access to
resources not available to the agents in the competitive equilibrium. The welfare costs arise
instead because when the government can access state-contingent debt or taxes, the ability
28to implement perfect risk pooling results in public and private expenditure allocations that
°uctuate much less than when the economy lacks state-contingent ¯scal instruments. As Table
4 shows, the standard deviation of public expenditures (private consumption) is 13.5 (2.3)
times higher in the competitive equilibrium than in domestic social optimum.
3.4 The Revenue Process and Public Debt Dynamics
The properties of the stochastic process of public revenue are a key determinant of the equi-
librium dynamics of public debt that the model produces. The signi¯cantly larger e®ects of
the tax shock compared to those of the GDP shock found in the impulse response analysis al-
ready illustrate this fact. This subsection explores further the dependence of the quantitative
predictions of the MPE on the stochastic properties of the tax process. The analysis focuses
on the e®ects of parametric changes in the mean, variance, and autocorrelation of the implied
tax rate.
Altering the mean implied tax rate changes not only the ability of the government to provide
public goods, but also the nature of the insurance problem and the distortions separating the
competitive equilibrium from the domestic social optimum. Figure 12 shows three limiting
distributions of public debt in the MPE, one for each of three values of the mean tax rate:
¿y = 0:20, ¿y = 0:256 (as in the baseline calibration), and ¿y = 0:30. The ¯gure shows that the
mean and variance of public debt grow with the tax rate because the ability of the government
to rely on ¯nancial markets to smooth their expenditures improves with the government's
capacity to collect revenue. The ¯gure also illustrates the sensitivity of the government's
natural debt limit to the tax rate: six percentage points di®erence in the mean value of ¯scal
revenue (between 0.256 and 0.20) reduce the natural debt limit of bg by 55 percentage points.
The e®ects of changes in the mean tax rate on the business cycle moments of other macroe-
conomic aggregates are illustrated in Figure 13. Each plot in that ¯gure displays the mean tax
rate on the horizontal axis, and the mean and standard deviation of a di®erent variable of the
MPE on the vertical axes (the left axis shows the means and the right axis shows the standard
deviations). The mean and the standard deviation of public debt, public expenditures, the
ratio gt=ct, and the primary ¯scal balance increase as the mean tax rate rises. In contrast, the
29mean of private expenditures falls but they also become more variable.
The changes in the moments of the gt=ct ratio illustrate how changes in the mean tax rate
a®ect the behavior of the competitive equilibrium relative to the domestic social optimum. At
one end, if the tax rate were zero, the government could not provide any public expenditures
or issue any debt (since its natural debt limit would be negative, as it would still need to make
time-invariant transfer payments). In this case, the ratio of public to private expenditures
goes to zero, as all the wealth is concentrated in the private sector, and the welfare loss of the
competitive equilibrium relative to the social optimum is in¯nitely large. At the other end,
if the tax rate were 1, the private sector still retains some income in the form of government
transfers, but its net-of-tax endowment income is zero, and hence its ability to borrow is
signi¯cantly reduced and its wealth is signi¯cantly smaller than the public sector's. The
collective welfare cost relative to the domestic social optimum is very large because now the
private sector ends up with consumption allocations very distant from those obtained in that
optimum. These observations suggest that the welfare costs of domestic market incompleteness
are a non-monotonic function of the mean tax rate, with larger costs at the extremes, when
the implied tax is very high or very low, than for values in between.
Figures 14 and 15 conduct sensitivity experiments for the e®ects of changes in the variability
and persistence of the implied tax process (keeping the mean tax rate equal to its baseline value
of 0.256). Figure 14 (15) shows the means (standard deviations) of the endogenous variables
change as the autocorrelation and the variance of the implied tax process increase. The x-axis
of each plot in these graphs displays the autocorrelation and variance of the innovations to
the implied tax as a ration relative to the value of these parameters in the baseline scenario.
Hence, when x = 1, the results shown in the ¯gures correspond to the means (Figure 14) and
standard deviations (Figure 15) of the variables obtained in the baseline.11
Figure 14 shows that when the tax shocks are more persistent or when the variance of their
innovations is higher, the mean value of public debt falls. Increasing the persistence or the
variance of innovations raises the volatility of the tax shocks, so the model predicts more limited
access of the government to debt markets. As the mean of ¯scal revenue remains constant in
this exercise, the long-run average of public expenditures increases when less resources are
11Note that, by construction, the two lines in each pane intersect when x = 1.
30spent debt service. Figure 14 also shows that the means of consumption and the primary
balance fall, and that of the gt=ct ratio increases, as the variability or persistence of the tax
process rises. In contrast, Figure 15 shows that increases in the variability or persistence of
the implied tax process a®ect the standard deviations of all variables in the same direction,
making all of them increase as the autocorrelation or variance of the tax shocks rises.
Finally, we examine the model's ability to account for the inverse relationship between
average public debt ratios and coe±cients of variability of public revenues found in the data.
To this end, we added to Figure 3 \arti¯cial" observations obtained by solving the model
for 45 di®erent values of the coe±cient of variation of public revenues taken to approximate
those observed in the international data. In each case, the model yields an endogenous long-run
average for the public debt-GDP ratio.12 These arti¯cial observations are identi¯ed by asterisks
in Figure 3, and the continuous curve in the same plot represents the corresponding logarithmic
regression line. As the plot shows, the model is consistent with the data in predicting that (a)
the long-run average debt ratio is a negative function of the variability of ¯scal revenues, and
(b) this relationship is non-linear, with the ability to sustain average debt ratios declining at
a faster rate as the coe±cient of variation of public revenues increases. A comparison of the
model's regression line with that produced with actual data shows, however, that the model's
mean debt-revenue variability curve is steeper than that observed in the data.
4 Concluding Remarks
Fiscal policy in developing countries di®ers sharply from that of industrial countries in four key
respects: (1) public revenue-GDP ratios are much smaller and signi¯cantly more volatile; (2)
countries with more variable revenue ratios support lower average debt ratios; (3) the cyclical
variability of government expenditures exceeds that of private expenditures by large margins;
and (4) ¯scal policy follows acyclical or procyclical patterns, with GDP correlations of the
primary balance (government expenditures) close to zero or slightly negative (positive).
This paper proposes a model of ¯scal policy in small open economies with incomplete asset
12Each of the 45 coe±cients of variation of public revenues was generated by forming a grid containing ¯ve
values of the element (2,2) of the autocorrelation matrix ^ © and nine values of the element (2,2) of the covariance
matrix ^ §² passed to the Tauchen's algorithm described in the Baseline Calibration of Section 3.
31markets that can rationalize these facts. The model characterizes optimal debt and expenditure
policies in an environment in which the government tends to act as a \tormented insurer",
seeking to keep payments to the private sector smooth despite low and volatile revenues and
debt markets limited to non-state-contingent debt. The competitive equilibrium exhibits shifts
in the distribution of wealth across the private and public sector, which are solved for in
recursive forms as a Markov perfect equilibrium.
Domestic asset market incompleteness has important implications for welfare and for op-
timal public debt and government expenditure choices. The welfare costs arising from this
form of market incompleteness are evaluated by comparing the MPE with the domestic social
optimum attained by a planner who can pool the ¯scal risk, and thus equate the marginal
utilities of public and private expenditures across states and over time. The average welfare
costs of imperfect domestic risk sharing are large, with an average gain of 4.9 percent in a
utility-equivalent compensating variation in stationary consumption calculated with the limit-
ing distribution of the MPE, or 1.6 percent if the stationary distribution of the social optimum
is used instead. Costs of these magnitude dwarf the negligible costs of imperfect risk sharing
and cyclical variability of consumption obtained with conventional RBC models.
The model is able to explain why countries su®ering from higher ¯scal risk support lower
average public debt-GDP ratios. In particular, the model is consistent with international data
in producing a negative, non-linear relationship between the variability of ¯scal revenues and
the average public debt ratios. The model also matches the GDP-correlations of government
expenditures and the primary ¯scal balance found in data for Mexico, and is consistent with the
data in producing higher cyclical variability in public expenditures than in private expenditures.
An interesting goal for future research would be to investigate the implications for the
competitive equilibrium and the welfare of a modi¯cation of the MPE in which the govern-
ment shifts from the implied tax on GDP to a non-state-contingent consumption tax. This
modi¯cation adds complexity to the MPE by introducing two-way feedback between the plans
of the private and public sector via an endogenous tax base determined by the private sector's
consumption plans. The presumption is that the consumption tax may be more desirable from
a social welfare perspective because private consumption smoothing can act as an endogenous
stabilizer that yields more stable ¯scal revenues than the implied tax (i.e., than commodity
32export revenues). In turn, reduced revenue variability implies more access to debt for the
government and improved ability to self-insure and smooth expenditures.
Appendix: Markov Chain for GDP and Implied Tax Rate
The Markov chain representing the dynamics of the exogenous state variables, aggregate income
(or GDP) and implied tax rates, is characterized by the (9 £ 9) state-transition matrix P,
and the (9 £ 2) matrix E containing all possible realizations of the income and tax shocks,
² = (²y;²¿). These two matrices along with the vector ¼E
1 that represents the unconditional











0.1853 0.3210 0.0348 0.1496 0.2592 0.0281 0.0075 0.0131 0.0014
0.0988 0.3950 0.0988 0.0652 0.2609 0.0652 0.0027 0.0108 0.0027
0.0412 0.3807 0.2197 0.0223 0.2057 0.1187 0.0008 0.0069 0.0040
0.0464 0.0804 0.0087 0.2268 0.3929 0.0425 0.0693 0.1201 0.0130
0.0278 0.1111 0.0278 0.1111 0.4444 0.1111 0.0278 0.1111 0.0278
0.0130 0.1201 0.0693 0.0425 0.3929 0.2268 0.0087 0.0804 0.0464
0.0040 0.0069 0.0008 0.1187 0.2057 0.0223 0.2197 0.3807 0.0412
0.0027 0.0108 0.0027 0.0652 0.2609 0.0652 0.0988 0.3950 0.0988
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35Table 1: Calibration of the Model to the Mexican Economy
Notation Parameter / Variable Value
¯ Discount factor 0.925
° Gross growth rate 1.00888
Ág Natural debt limit on public debt 1.3183
Á Ad-hoc debt limit on international assets -0.5000
¾ Coe±cient of relative risk aversion 2.0000
¿ Mean income-tax rate 0.2558
R Gross world interest rate 1.0986
x Private investment expenditures 0.2262
z Government transfers 0.1114
- Minimum value of government debt 0.0000
- Maximum value of international assets 0.1000
Table 2: Unconditional Moments of GDP and the Implied Tax Rate.
Mexican Annual Data, 1980-2004 and Unconditional Moments of the
Markov Chain
Statistic Mexican data Markov chain
(a) (b)
GDP Implied GDP Implied
tax rate tax rate
Standard deviation 0.02948 0.06027 0.02781 0.05689
Minimum -0.07073 -0.12294 -0.04670 -0.09991
Maximum 0.05018 0.01080 0.04670 0.09991
Cross correlation -0.24172 -0.24172 -0.19786 -0.19786
Autocorrelation 0.351 0.535 0.278 0.576
36Table 3: Moments of Macroeconomic Aggregates in the Ergodic Distribution of the
Markov Perfect Equilibrium (Baseline Calibration)
Variable (x) E[x] ¾(x) cv(x) ½(x) ½(x;yi), where yi =
GDP After- Fiscal
tax inc. revenue
GDP 1.00 2.80 2.80 0.28 1.00 0.86 0.28
GNP 0.97 3.03 3.13 0.42 0.95 0.82 0.26
Atfer-tax income 0.74 2.78 3.73 0.38 0.86 1.00 -0.25
Consumption 0.64 3.20 4.97 0.97 0.20 0.24 -0.07
International assets -0.36 10.73 -29.72 0.98 0.08 0.08 0.00
Total assets 0.17 32.20 188.27 1.00 0.02 0.05 -0.05
Gov. expenditures 0.10 2.83 29.07 1.00 0.02 -0.04 0.12
Tax rate 0.26 1.47 5.73 0.58 -0.20 -0.68 0.88
Fisc revenue 0.26 1.50 5.86 0.53 0.28 -0.25 1.00
Primary ¯scal bce. 0.05 3.05 64.47 0.90 0.12 -0.09 0.38
Public debt 0.53 30.51 57.37 1.00 0.00 0.02 -0.05
Gov. expend. / cons. 0.15 5.07 33.01 1.00 -0.01 -0.07 0.11
Trade balance 0.03 2.55 79.43 0.34 0.82 0.68 0.28
Current account 0.00 2.27 - 0.24 0.96 0.80 0.31
Note: For each variable x, E[x] is the mean, ¾(x) the percentage standard deviation, cv(x) the
percentage coe±cient of variation, ½(x) the autocorrelation, and ½(x;yi) the cross-correlation with


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































38Figure 1: Average Public Revenue-GDP Ratios in Emerging and Industrial
Countries: 1990-2002
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Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, September 2003.
39Figure 2: Coe±cients of variation of Public Revenue-GDP Ratios in
Emerging and Industrial Countries: 1990-2002
0 5 10 15 20

















































Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, September 2003.
40Figure 3: Volatility of Fiscal Revenues and Average Public Debt Ratios



































y=1.51 − 0.49 ln(x)
y=0.92 − 0.19 ln(x)











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































42Figure 5: Carroll's Condition, Discount Factor and Mean Value of
Public Debt-GDP Ratio



































































Note: Carroll's (2004) condition required to prevent public debt diverging to
¡1 is ¯R £max[R¡¾;°¡¾] < 1. In the baseline calibration, ° = 1:00888, ¾ =
2, R = 1:0986, and ¯ = 0:925, so the condition is satis¯ed as ¯R°¡¾ = 0:9984.
The graph is constructed for three values of ¾, keeping unchanged the values
of ° and R, and considering values of ¯ 2 [0:875;0:92647]. The natural debt
limit of public debt in the baseline calibration is equal to 1.3183.
43Figure 6: Marginal Distribution of Public Debt and
International Assets in the Limiting Distribution of the
MPE under Baseline Calibration








































































44Figure 7: Forecasting Functions of Assets































































































































































































































































































Figure 8: Simulations of Public Debt Using
Simulations of the Markov Chain and Optimal Policy
Functions
































Mean of simulated debt ratio at t=50: 0.515
Note: The starting value of public debt is equal to 0.634 (10
percentage points above its mean value in the limiting distri-
bution).
45Figure 9: Impulse Response Functions of the Ratio
of Government Expenditures to Consumption in the
Competitive Equilibrium















Response to tax shock
Response to output shock
Note: Estimation errors are orthogonalized using the Choleski
decomposition of the covariance matrix of the residuals so the
innovations are equal to one standard deviation of the orthog-
onalized covariance matrix of errors.
Figure 10: Impulse Response Functions to a Tax
Shock in the Competitive Equilibrium































































Note: Estimation errors are orthogonalized using the Choleski decomposition of the covari-
ance matrix of the residuals so the innovations are equal to one standard deviation of the
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competitive equilibrium domestic social optimum
Figure 11 Impulse Response Functions to an Output Shock in the
Competitive Equilibrium and the Domestic Social Optimum
(responses to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations)
net foreign assets current account
private consumption government expenditures
47Figure 12: Mean of Implied Income-Tax Rate and the
Limiting Marginal Distribution of Public Debt




























Figure 13: Mean of Implied Income-Tax Rate and the Mean and Standard
Deviation of Macroeconomic Aggregates in the MPE
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Note: The x-axis in each plot shows the mean tax rates of the implied tax process and
the two y-axes show, the mean value of each variable on the scale on the left-hand-side,
and the standard deviation of each variable on the scale on the right-hand-side.
48Figure 14: Autocorrelation and Variance of the Innovations to the Tax
Process: E®ect on the Means of Macroeconomic Ratios in the Markov
Perfect Equilibrium
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Note: The x-axis in each plot shows the values of the autocorrelation and variance of the
innovations to the tax process measured with respect to the values of these parameters of
the tax process in the baseline calibration. When x = 1, the variance of the innovations
to the tax process is equal to its steady-state value (i.e. 0.002378) and the autocorrelation
is equal to 0.60.
49Figure 15: Autocorrelation and Variance of the Innovations to the Tax
Process: E®ect on the Standard Deviations of Macroeconomic Ratios in
the Markov Perfect Equilibrium
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Note: The x-axis in each plot shows the values of the autocorrelation and variance of the
innovations to the tax process measured with respect to the values of these parameters of
the tax process in the baseline calibration. When x = 1, the variance of the innovations
to the tax process is equal to its steady-state value (i.e. 0.002378) and the autocorrelation
is equal to 0.60.
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